At the centre of this challenge is Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), the foundational systems that enable governments and citizens to interact securely and efficiently through digital identity, payments, data exchange and trusted communications.
A week after the Sadiku-led Boko Haram faction killed and abducted more than 170 women and children from Woro in Kaiama, Kwara State, the terror group released a video on TikTok mocking the government and accusing it of “deceit and infidelity” for downplaying the number of kidnapped victims.
Shortly after the clip went viral in February, both the video and the account disappeared from the platform, suggesting that the account may have been deactivated or the content removed. A recent check, however, showed that the account, likely created in 2025, has resumed disseminating propaganda messages and sermons by jihadi ideologues, including late Boko Haram founder Muhammad Yusuf.
The message was not merely propaganda. It reflected a growing global challenge in which extremist groups exploit digital platforms and weaknesses in digital governance systems to communicate, spread propaganda, recruit followers and project power far beyond the physical battlefield.
At the centre of this challenge is Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), the foundational systems that enable governments and citizens to interact securely and efficiently through digital identity, payments, data exchange and trusted communications. While DPI is often discussed in the context of financial inclusion, service delivery and economic development, security experts increasingly argue that it is also becoming a critical component of national security.
As governments digitise public services and expand connectivity, extremist groups have become more adept at exploiting the same digital ecosystem to influence audiences, spread narratives and evade traditional security responses.
The TikTok video showing the abducted victims from Woro, however, represented more than a propaganda stunt. It highlighted how terrorism itself is evolving in the digital age.
The exploitation of social media by extremist groups is not unique to Nigeria.
From the Islamic State’s sophisticated media machinery to al-Qaeda channels on Telegram and violent far-right networks operating across Europe and North America, terrorist organisations have transformed digital platforms into strategic assets, according to the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP).
What were originally communication tools have become part of the infrastructure through which extremist groups recruit followers, disseminate propaganda, coordinate activities, raise funds and shape public perception.
“The war is not [only] about guns and bullets again,” said Malik Samuel, a security analyst and senior researcher at Good Governance Africa (GGA). “It is now more of an information warfare.”
Governments around the world have spent years trying to adapt to this reality.
In West Africa, where Islamic State and al-Qaeda franchises wreak havoc in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, regional efforts such as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit have largely focused on intelligence sharing, military cooperation and counterterrorism operations on the ground.
In Europe and North America, security agencies increasingly view online propaganda not merely as harmful content but as part of a broader ecosystem capable of facilitating recruitment, radicalisation and operational coordination.
One of the most notable examples emerged in Europe, where coordinated Europol-led operations dismantled key elements of the Islamic State’s online propaganda infrastructure. Rather than focusing solely on individual posts or accounts, investigators targeted the servers, websites, applications and communication systems that enabled extremist content to circulate globally.
These efforts pushed many extremist organisations away from mainstream platforms and into more obscure digital spaces, particularly encrypted Telegram channels, where propaganda networks sustained by automated accounts and sympathisers continue to operate.
Yet the rise of TikTok created new opportunities.
Since TikTok’s rapid global expansion, researchers and law enforcement agencies have documented how extremist actors exploit the platform’s recommendation-driven ecosystem to amplify propaganda and expand their reach.
An Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) report titled ‘CaliphateTok’ identified an active network of at least 20 Islamic State-supporting TikTok accounts that collectively amassed more than one million views. Europol has similarly documented the presence of terrorist and violent extremist content on the platform.
In September 2023, Europol’s European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) and TikTok coordinated a multinational operation involving 11 countries that identified more than 2,100 pieces of suspected terrorist and violent extremist content, including material linked to jihadist and violent far-right networks.
What distinguishes many Western responses is not the absence of extremist content but the existence of dedicated institutions designed to continuously monitor, analyse and disrupt terrorist online ecosystems.
For example, Europol’s EU Internet Referral Unit (IRU), established in 2015, operates as a permanent capability that tracks extremist propaganda, supports online investigations, works with technology companies to facilitate content removals and maintains databases used in criminal investigations and prosecutions.
In June 2024, Europol, in collaboration with Eurojust and US authorities, dismantled online infrastructure supporting multiple Islamic State media outlets, taking down servers used to distribute propaganda and operational messages in at least 30 languages.
The operation demonstrated how modern counterterrorism increasingly focuses not only on content moderation but on disrupting the digital infrastructure that sustains extremist networks.
Nigeria is not isolated from these global trends.
Over the past decade, the country has made significant investments in DPI. The National Identification Number (NIN), Bank Verification Number (BVN), mobile telecommunications networks, and expanding digital government services have laid the foundations for a rapidly digitising society.
Yet, while Nigeria’s digital infrastructure has expanded, questions remain about whether equivalent investments have been made in the systems required to secure that ecosystem against emerging threats.
The growing presence of extremist actors on TikTok and other social media platforms illustrates the challenge.
For years, insurgent groups such as Boko Haram and its breakaway faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), relied on intermediaries, clandestine websites and tightly controlled channels to disseminate messages about battlefield activities and ideological positions.
That model is changing. Platforms such as TikTok allow armed groups to bypass traditional gatekeepers and communicate directly with followers, potential recruits, local communities, victims and even the state itself.
