This report, the first part of a PREMIUM TIMES series of untold stories about last year’s alleged attempt to topple President Tinubu’s administration, paints a fuller picture of the alleged conspirators’ preparations toward the D-Day and H-Hour and the transition plan that would follow.
Fresh details of the operational blueprint allegedly developed by military officers accused of plotting to overthrow President Bola Tinubu’s administration last year have emerged. These include how they assigned targets to individual operatives, adopted coded language, filtered dates for the planned strike, and mapped out logistics for the operation. The new details also include the alleged conspirators’ transition plan.
These documents showed that the alleged conspiracy centred on capturing strategic military installations, securing broadcast facilities, mobilising troops and neutralising senior military leadership.
Previous reporting by PREMIUM TIMES revealed that the alleged plot was coordinated principally by Mohammed Ma’aji, a Nigerian Army colonel, alongside a retired colonel M.M. Adamu, Shamsuddeen Bappah, a lieutenant-colonel and Abdulkarim Ibrahim, a major.
The trio of these officers—except Mr Adamu, whom military authorities said remains at large—gave separate, corroborating statements about the operational plan for the alleged plot. The conspirators used coded words and phrases to communicate during meetings or when talking about the plot.
For instance, while they referred to themselves as farmers, they codenamed the entire movement as farming. Other agricultural-related words were used: Fertilisers as logistics, harvest as the execution day, digital farming as the operation and technical partners as clerics approached for prayers.
They also used “H-hour” to mean execution time and “D-Day” as the day of execution.
This report paints a fuller picture of the alleged plotters’ preparations for D-Day and H-Hour, and what they intended to do thereafter.
Mr Ibrahim told investigators that they proposed launching the operation between 1 a.m. and 2 a.m., describing the timing as consistent with previous military takeovers.
He said although no final date was agreed, three possible dates repeatedly featured during planning: 27 September 2025, 1 October 2025 (the Independence Day) and 4 October 2025. The other officers, including Mr Ma’aji, corroborated some of these dates.
One of the suspects, Ilyasu Jamilu, a major, told investigators that while 27 September, 1 October and a later date were discussed, the conspirators never settled on a final date because preparations had not been completed.
However, Mr Ibrahim said the alleged leader of the plot told them that the final D-Day depended largely on the availability of troops, weapons and other logistics.
“Col Ma’aji mentioned that the availability of troops and equipment would determine which of the dates would be D-Day,” he stated.
According to the documents, each participant was assigned a strategic task.
Mr Usman was tasked with leading the operation at the Presidential Aso Villa, the seat of Nigeria’s presidency, after conducting reconnaissance of the complex with the assistance of insiders, including a police officer, Ahmed Ibrahim.
The prosecution has shared more details about the planned attack on the Presidential Villa in the ongoing trial regarding the alleged coup at the Federal High Court in Abuja.
A video exhibit played by the prosecution during a proceeding in May showed one of the six defendants connected to the alleged coup, Zekeri Umoru, telling interrogators that the coup planners considered switching off the electricity supply to the Presidential Villa, Abuja, at the zero hour of the planned strike.
But Mr Umoru, a Julius Berger Nigeria Plc employee in the Maintenance Department at the Presidential Villa, said he warned that such a sudden power outage would trigger investigations and the detention of workers on duty.
He said the alleged coup leaders planned to recruit between 18 and 19 persons, including soldiers, State Security Service (SSS) operatives and Julius Berger staff members working within the Villa.
Mr Bappah was assigned to seize and hold 102 Battalion, Zuma, Niger State, while Mr Ibrahim was initially assigned to secure the Armed Forces Headquarters complex before his role was changed to Radio House in Abuja, where he was expected to deliver the takeover speech.
A Nigerian Air Force squadron leader, S.B. Adamu, was assigned to seize Air House; Muhammad Jiddah, a major, was tasked with taking control of the residence of the then Chief of Army Staff (COAS), Olufemi Oluyede, while Daniel Yusuf, also a major, was assigned to the residence of the then-Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Christopher Musa, now the defence minister.
The documents also show that Akinwale Yusuf, a captain who was in Lagos, was expected to seize a divisional headquarters there, while Mr Adamu, the fugitive retired colonel, would coordinate activities from the gate of Niger Barracks in Abuja.
Mr Ibrahim told investigators that although Mr Bappah was initially expected to make the nationwide broadcast announcing the takeover, that responsibility was later transferred to him.
Based on the documents reviewed for this report, airports formed a critical part of the alleged plan.
According to Mr Ibrahim, the conspirators concluded that the operation could not succeed if aircraft were allowed to continue landing and taking off.
He said the plan was to deploy squadron leader Noel Zuzu’s gun truck onto the runway to halt flight operations in Abuja during the takeover.
Also, Sunday Felix, a lieutenant, stated that he had been tasked with surveying the airport in Lagos, gathering operational information and disrupting flight activities on “D-Day” with the assistance of an engineer.
“I knew the airport’s security arrangements due to my role in traffic control during visits of VIPs,” Felix reportedly told investigators.
The records indicate that the alleged conspirators intended to draw manpower and equipment from several military formations.
In his statement, Mr Ma’aji told investigators that Mr Usman would source resources from 45 Special Forces Battalion, Bida; Ponfa Dangnap, a lieutenant colonel, would mobilise troops and equipment from 134 Battalion in the North-east, while Mr Ibrahim was expected to generate resources from 198 Battalion, also in the North-east.
