*Says Council Of Legal Education Must Look Beyond Technicalities To Determine Whether Deputy Speaker’s Certificate Stands On Unimpeachable Foundation
Legal commentator Dr. Ifeanyi Dike has challenged the response of Deputy Speaker Benjamin Kalu’s legal team to the Council of Legal Education petition seeking the withdrawal of his qualifying certificate, arguing that their characterisation of the petition as “fundamentally deficient in law” and “dead on arrival” may be “a striking political line” but does not resolve the “serious institutional and ethical questions” the petition raises, and that the Council must look beyond technicalities to satisfy itself that its certificate was issued on an unimpeachable foundation.
In a detailed analysis titled “When Technicalities Meet Trust,” Dr. Dike systematically examined and critiqued each of the three core arguments advanced by Kalu’s solicitors in their response to the Council, concluding that while the arguments are “neat and technical,” they are “unduly narrow” and fail to address the substantive question at the heart of the complaint: whether the Deputy Speaker simultaneously participated in the Nigerian Law School programme and the National Youth Service Corps scheme, and if so, whether that concurrency was managed in a manner consistent with the requirements of both institutions.
“What is not credible is the suggestion that the petition is ‘dead on arrival’ simply because no express prohibition or penalty is cited chapter and verse,” Dr. Dike stated. “The law may be written in statutes and handbooks; trust is written in how institutions respond when those texts are tested.”
Dr. Dike identified three core arguments advanced by the Deputy Speaker’s solicitors in their response to the Council of Legal Education.
First, the legal team argued that the Council, as a statutory body, lacks express power to withdraw or cancel a qualifying certificate after the fact, except in cases of clear criminal misconduct established through formal criminal proceedings.
Second, they argued that the declaration relied upon by the petitioner is unsworn and carries no legal weight.
Third, they argued that at the material time, no statute, regulation, handbook, or convention expressly prohibited concurrent participation in the Nigerian Law School programme and the NYSC scheme, or prescribed any penalty for doing so.
On that basis, the legal team urged the Council to decline jurisdiction and dismiss the petition outright.
Dr. Dike’s response to these arguments was respectful but firm.
“This line of reasoning is neat and technical. It is also, with respect, unduly narrow,” Dr. Dike stated.
He argued that the petition does not merely invite the Council to find a specific provision that prohibits simultaneous participation in Law School and NYSC. Rather, it “raises a more fundamental question: whether the qualifying certificate in issue was issued on a factual foundation that was regular, truthful and consistent with the standards expected of a person seeking admission into the legal profession.”
“That question cannot be answered solely by pointing to what the Legal Education Act or a particular student handbook did not say,” Dr. Dike stated.
Dr. Dike identified what he described as the most conspicuous gap in the legal team’s response: the emphasis on the absence of a prohibition rather than a clear factual denial.
“It is also notable that the reported response of the legal team appears to emphasise the absence of a prohibition more than it asserts a clear factual denial,” Dr. Dike observed.
“The real reassurance the public and the profession need is not that ‘no rule expressly banned it,’ but whether the alleged concurrency did or did not occur, and if it did, how it was managed within the requirements of both institutions,” he stated.
“Where a complaint touches on integrity, a firm factual clarification is more convincing than a jurisdictional objection,” Dr. Dike added.
The observation goes to the heart of the matter. Both the Nigerian Law School and the NYSC scheme are structured, full-time national programmes. Each carries obligations of attendance, physical presence, supervision, discipline, and truthful disclosure to the relevant authorities.
“The core issue is whether, as a matter of practical reality and institutional expectation, both programmes could have been undertaken concurrently without misrepresentation, concealment or derogation from either scheme. That is a question of substance, not of clever drafting,” Dr. Dike stated.
On the second argument, that the declaration relied upon by the petitioner is unsworn and therefore weightless, Dr. Dike acknowledged the point may have “some force in strict adversarial litigation” but argued it is misplaced in the context of a professional regulatory inquiry.
“The Council of Legal Education is not a criminal court adjudicating guilt beyond reasonable doubt; it is a professional regulator determining whether its own certificate was issued in circumstances that meet its standards of regularity and character,” Dr. Dike stated.
“In that setting, the Council is entitled to treat the petition as an invitation to open an inquiry, call for records, and seek clarification. The form of the initial complaint does not foreclose the Council’s power to verify the underlying facts,” he added.
The distinction is significant. In court proceedings, the rules of evidence require sworn statements, admissible documents, and compliance with procedural formalities. In a regulatory inquiry, the body investigating has broader latitude to examine records, request information, and determine facts through its own processes. The fact that the initial complaint may not meet the evidentiary standards of a courtroom does not prevent the Council from investigating the substance of the allegations through its own procedures.
Dr. Dike reserved his strongest criticism for the third argument: that the Council cannot act unless criminal proceedings have first established misconduct.
“The insistence on criminal proceedings as a precondition for any regulatory consequence is particularly problematic,” Dr. Dike stated.
“Professional bodies the world over act every day on issues of propriety, eligibility and fitness to practise that do not amount to crimes and may never be the subject of prosecution,” he observed.
“The ‘fit and proper person’ test in legal ethics has always been broader than ‘not a convicted felon.’ A regulator that insists it is helpless unless a criminal court has spoken abdicates its protective function and reduces itself to a mere record-keeper,” Dr. Dike stated.
He acknowledged the constitutional constraint that “no person should be punished with a truly penal sanction for an act that was not criminalised and sanctioned in advance.” However, he drew a critical distinction between criminal punishment and regulatory correction.
“Not every regulatory correction is a ‘punishment’ in the strict criminal sense. The Council’s primary concern is the integrity of its own certification process,” Dr. Dike stated.
“If it were ever to conclude, after fair hearing and full inquiry, that a certificate was obtained on the basis of material misrepresentation or non-compliance, it is difficult to argue that it must simply look away because the conduct was not codified as an ‘offence’ with a specified sentence at the time,” he added.
Dr. Dike addressed the fact that a related complaint touching on similar issues had already been dismissed by the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee, clarifying that this dismissal does not constitute a factual exoneration.
“That body did so on jurisdictional grounds, effectively indicating that matters concerning Law School training and NYSC service fall within the remit of the Council of Legal Education and other administrative authorities, not the LPDC,” Dr. Dike explained.
“That outcome did not amount to a factual exoneration; it simply confirmed where the question should properly be addressed,” he stated.
The LPDC’s jurisdictional dismissal actually supports the current petition’s filing with the Council of Legal Education. The LPDC effectively pointed to the Council as the appropriate body to consider the matter, which is precisely where the petition has now been filed.
Dr. Dike acknowledged what he described as an unavoidable political dimension to the case.
