A constitutional position paper prepared for the National Executive Council of the Agulu Peoples Union has concluded that the Onowu, acting as Regent during the interregnum following the death of the Igwe of Agulu, has no constitutional authority to create new traditional institutions, permanently restructure existing traditional enclaves, or make appointments to the Igwe-in-Council.
The paper, referenced APU/NEC/RGNCY/2026/001 and dated August 2026, is addressed for submission to the APU National Executive Council, the Igwe-in-Council, Agulu, and the Honourable Commissioner for Local Government, Chieftaincy and Community Affairs, Anambra State.
The paper states its purpose at the outset, and distances itself from any personality. It says it “does not target any individual officeholder by name, nor does it diminish the dignity of the office of the Onowu or the institution of the Regency,” and that its purpose “is singular: to state, clearly and without ambiguity, the constitutional scope and limits of Regency authority during interregnum under the APU Constitution and applicable Anambra State law.”
On the nature of the moment, it says: “The death of a reigning Igwe is a solemn moment for any community. The period that follows, the interregnum, is constitutionally sensitive. It demands not the suspension of the constitutional order, but its most diligent observance. It demands not unilateral action, but heightened collective governance. It demands not the assertion of expanded personal authority, but the faithful discharge of defined custodial responsibilities.”
The question it sets for determination is whether the Onowu, as Regent, may create a new traditional institution or permanently restructure existing traditional enclaves within Agulu without the collective consultation processes mandated by the APU Constitution. Its answer is that he may not.
The paper adds that the question is live rather than theoretical. “This question is not academic. Specific actions have been taken or are being contemplated during the current interregnum that implicate this question directly. The constitutional order demands a clear answer, grounded in law and not in personalities, personal influence, or political expediency.”
The paper’s first argument is structural. It contends that the APU Constitution “deliberately and systematically creates a collective system of traditional governance in which no single individual, not even the substantive Igwe, exercises unilateral authority over matters of custom, tradition, or the structure of traditional institutions.”
It sets out how authority is distributed. The Igwe is head of Ndi Nze na Ozo na Ndi Ichie Agulu, who advise him on custom and tradition under Section 103. He rules with an Igwe-in-Council comprising elected village representatives and four members nominated at his discretion under Section 105. A Customs and Traditions Committee is established by the NEC in consultation with the Igwe-in-Council to ensure uniform regulation of Agulu customs and traditions under Section 36. Special traditional titles require consultation with the NEC, the Igwe-in-Council and representatives of the autonomous traditional institutions under Sections 116 and 65(b). Even the conferment of titles by the Igwe is limited to six worthy indigenes triennially, in consultation with the Igwe-in-Council and the NEC, under Section 116(c).
The paper draws its inference from that design. “This architecture is not accidental. The Constitution deliberately distributes authority across multiple organs precisely to prevent any individual from unilaterally altering the traditional order of Agulu. The existence of these collective consultation mechanisms is itself evidence that the Constitution does not confer unilateral power on any single officeholder, including the Igwe himself.”
Turning to the Regency, the paper notes that the First Schedule to the APU Constitution, the Code of Conduct for Igwe of Agulu, provides at paragraph (xiv) that where the Igwe is absent or unable to discharge his functions for more than three months, “the Onowu shall act on his behalf.”
It fixes on those words. “This is the language of a delegated, derivative, and temporary authority. The Onowu acts on behalf of the Igwe. He does not become the Igwe. He does not inherit the Igwe’s full constitutional powers. He exercises those powers that are reasonably necessary to discharge the Igwe’s functions on a caretaker basis.”
From that it derives the governing principle. “A delegated authority cannot exceed the source authority from which it is derived. If the substantive Igwe is constitutionally required to act through consultation with the Igwe-in-Council, the NEC, and the Customs and Traditions Committee when dealing with matters of custom and tradition, then a temporary Regent, whose authority is derivative of the Igwe’s, cannot lawfully act without those same consultations.”
It puts the point more compactly: “A temporary office cannot be greater than the substantive institution it temporarily preserves. The Regent cannot logically inherit a power that the Constitution did not give the Igwe in the first place.”
On institutional creation, the paper relies on Section 36, which provides that the NEC shall, in consultation with the Igwe-in-Council, select the members of the Customs and Traditions Committee for the purpose of uniformly regulating Agulu custom and tradition.
It reasons that creating a new traditional institution or permanently restructuring an existing enclave necessarily affects traditional authority, hierarchy and jurisdiction within Agulu, alters relationships between existing institutions, potentially changes the titles, rights and standing of existing title holders, and creates precedents that will bind Agulu long after the interregnum has ended.
Its conclusion is stated flatly. “These are not caretaker functions. They are constitutional functions of the highest order, requiring the full collective consultation processes mandated by the Constitution. There is a fundamental constitutional distinction between maintaining and regulating an existing institution, which is within the Regent’s custodial scope, and permanently creating or restructuring an institution, which is not.”
The paper devotes a separate section to appointments made to the Igwe-in-Council during the interregnum.
Noting that Section 105 provides for a cabinet of 24 members drawn from the 20 villages of Agulu and that “His Royal Highness shall in his discretion appoint four members to the cabinet,” it holds that the power is vested exclusively in the substantive Igwe.
“It is a personal constitutional power that dies with the holder of the office. The Regent, whose authority is derivative and custodial, cannot exercise a power that is vested by the Constitution in the substantive Igwe alone. Any appointments made to the Igwe-in-Council after the death of the Igwe, without the constitutional authority of a substantive Igwe, are unconstitutional and of no legal effect within the APU constitutional framework.”
It adds that the consequence is institutional rather than technical. “An Igwe-in-Council whose membership has been unlawfully altered during the interregnum cannot legitimately claim to exercise the constitutional functions of that body.”
The paper turns next to state legislation. It notes that Section 12 of the Anambra State Traditional Rulers Law 2007 provides that where the stool of a Traditional Ruler becomes vacant, the next most senior traditional office holder shall act as Regent, and that “the Regent shall perform such functions as may be assigned to him by the Community or as are customarily performed by the Traditional Ruler during interregnum.”
It draws two points from the provision. First, that the Regent’s authority is expressly tied to functions customarily performed during interregnum, and that custom in Agulu, as codified in the APU Constitution, “has never included the unilateral creation of new traditional institutions or the permanent restructuring of existing ones.” Second, that the phrase “shall act” is functional language: “to act in law means to exercise defined functions, not to exceed them. The Regent is empowered to act; he is not empowered to act without limit.”
On what the statute does not do, the paper says it does not confer power to create new traditional institutions, does not override the consultative requirements of the community’s own constitution, does not grant the Regent a power greater than the substantive Traditional Ruler, and does not suspend collective governance during the interregnum.
Citing Section 7 of the same law, it says: “The statute anticipates continuity, not reinvention. Preserving and promoting the custom and tradition of the community means keeping what exists intact, not creating what did not exist before.”
The paper relies on Section 8 of the Anambra State Town Unions Law 2018, which makes the Executive Committee responsible for the day to day administration of the Town Union and the implementation of its Constitution and byelaws, identifying the APU NEC as that Executive Committee.
On Section 10, which provides that no person or group of persons shall interfere with the administration of a Town Union except as provided in the Law, it observes that the provision “cuts symmetrically: just as those who demand that the Regent do nothing may be interfering with constitutional governance, so too does any actor, including the Regent, who acts outside the Constitution’s mandated processes.”
It adds: “The Town Unions Law does not permit the dissolution or bypassing of the NEC’s constitutional role simply because the Igwe has died. On the contrary, the death of the Igwe heightens the constitutional importance of the NEC as the governing institution during the interregnum.”
Anticipating the argument that state law overrides the union’s internal constitution, the paper concedes the principle but denies its application here.
“State legislation on chieftaincy and traditional rulership takes precedence over a community union’s internal constitution where genuine conflict exists. However, there is no conflict here,” it says, describing the two instruments as mutually reinforcing.
It then states the limit of the principle. “Invoking State law to expand Regent authority beyond what the APU Constitution permits is not a proper application of the supremacy principle. State law sets the floor of Regent authority. It does not license the Regent to exceed the ceiling set by the community’s own constitutional architecture.”
The paper draws an express line between two categories of action.
Within scope, it lists convening the Igwe-in-Council for legitimate governance business, resolving disputes within existing traditional institutions, enforcing existing rules and regulations of established institutions, preventing usurpation of existing titles or enclaves, maintaining public order and peace, facilitating the rotational Igwe selection process under Sections 98 to 101, and working with the NEC and constitutionally established committees on matters of custom and tradition.
Outside scope, it lists creating a new traditional institution or body not previously existing in the constitutional order, permanently restructuring the composition, hierarchy or jurisdiction of existing traditional enclaves, making appointments to the Igwe-in-Council, altering the titles, standing or constitutional relationships of existing traditional institutions without full collective consultation, and issuing decrees or directives that bind the community permanently beyond the interregnum.
It stresses that the distinction is not between action and inaction. “The Constitution does not require the Regent to be passive. It requires him to be faithful to his defined constitutional role: preserving what exists, governing through institutions, and making the enthronement of the next Igwe his primary objective.”
The paper recommends that the NEC convene an emergency session to affirm the constitutional limits of Regency authority and communicate them to all relevant parties; that any interregnum actions purporting to create new traditional institutions or permanently restructure existing ones be suspended pending constitutional review by the NEC and the Customs and Traditions Committee under Section 36; and that any appointments made to the Igwe-in-Council after the death of the Igwe be referred to the NEC for review and set aside where found to be without constitutional basis.
