ANALYSIS: What a weakened Trump could mean for Nigeria, other African countries

Having secured both chambers of Congress, Democrats can now obstruct much of President Donald Trump’s remaining legislative agenda, intensify oversight, and challenge his most controversial policies.

The Democratic Party’s sweeping victory in the 3 November United States (US) midterm elections fundamentally alters the political landscape confronting President Donald Trump. Having secured both chambers of Congress, Democrats can now obstruct much of his remaining legislative agenda, intensify oversight, and challenge his most controversial policies.

Three defining features of Mr Trump’s second-term foreign policy could make this particularly consequential.

First, US diplomacy has become increasingly personalised, with Mr Trump’s relationships with foreign leaders carrying considerable weight in determining diplomatic priorities and outcomes. Second, with only two years remaining in his final term, Mr Trump will be concerned with cementing his legacy through highly visible peace agreements, commercial deals, and demonstrations of US hard power.

Third, US foreign policy remains fundamentally shaped by competition with China and enduring national security priorities. The ‘Monroe Doctrine’ of asserting US predominance across the Western Hemisphere exemplifies a coercive approach towards perceived strategic threats. Similar motivations underpin US competition for Africa’s critical minerals, commercial markets, and strategic infrastructure.

These three factors will likely prove self-reinforcing as Mr Trump pursues his remaining priorities with fewer legislative avenues for manoeuvre, and more incentives to secure visible international victories.

The midterms were unusual in how foreign policy became intertwined with domestic economic grievances. Mr Trump’s tariffs, military engagement in Iran, and strained relations with traditional allies contributed to wider affordability concerns. However, electoral repudiation does not necessarily compel presidents to abandon controversial international commitments. Instead, it changes how leaders pursue them.

Following the 2006 midterm Republican losses, George W. Bush escalated US military involvement in Iraq. After the Democrats’ substantial congressional losses in 2010 and 2014, Barack Obama relied on executive authority to advance policies obstructed by Republican lawmakers. Regulatory powers were used to pursue the Clean Power Plan and negotiate the Iran nuclear deal and the Paris climate agreement, without seeking Senate ratification.

Despite congressional investigations and legislative resistance after Republicans lost the House of Representatives in 2018, Mr Trump pursued unilateral trade measures, restrictive immigration policies, and other contentious foreign policies. In 2019, he declared a national emergency to redirect funding towards his proposed border wall. Similarly, Joe Biden depended increasingly on executive instruments after Republicans captured the House in 2022.

Congressional obstruction can therefore incentivise unilateral executive action on existing priorities.

Congress will not, however, be powerless. When Democrats take control on 3 January 2027, they can investigate executive decisions, influence foreign assistance and defence expenditure, obstruct presidential appointments, and block further Republican legislation.

But these instruments have limitations. Mr Trump’s veto and the Senate’s filibuster rules, which generally require 60 votes to overcome legislative hurdles, will complicate Democratic efforts to reverse existing policies. And unilateral foreign policy decisions by the White House could also cost Democratic lawmakers politically if they are forced to publicly oppose or defend controversial tariffs, sanctions, and military interventions.

For Africa, this creates a landscape of potential winners and losers, shaped less by congressional sympathies than by individual relationships, commercial bargaining power, and alignment with Trump’s priorities.

South Africa and Rwanda are particularly exposed. This month, Mr Trump announced his intention to terminate both countries’ eligibility under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, despite Congress extending the programme until December 2028.

For South Africa, bilateral tensions have become intertwined with Mr Trump’s grievances over Pretoria’s domestic policies and international alignments. Although durable commercial interests offer opportunities for engagement, congressional sympathy alone cannot reverse presidential trade restrictions. Indeed, Mr Trump might intensify pressure on South Africa to secure concessions before his remaining political leverage diminishes.

Rwanda’s position is more complicated. Its cooperation is essential to stabilising the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Yet Washington’s recent sanctions against its defence ministry and the Zigama Credit and Savings Society show Mr Trump’s willingness to punish partners failing to meet his expectations.

The DRC, conversely, could emerge as a relative beneficiary. Its critical minerals and strategic importance in competition with China make it an attractive partner, while Mr Trump’s pursuit of a peace agreement provides additional diplomatic incentives.

However, these opportunities carry risks. A US administration preoccupied with securing its legacy could prioritise public agreements and commercial arrangements over sustainable conflict resolution. Rwanda could face mounting pressure, while the DRC risks exchanging long-term mineral and security interests for short-term diplomatic gains.

Kenya, Zambia, and Morocco appear comparatively better positioned. Kenya’s counter-terrorism cooperation and regional commercial networks, Zambia’s copper reserves and role in the Lobito Corridor, and Morocco’s defence and industrial capabilities all align with US strategic interests.

These advantages could attract commercial and security engagement irrespective of congressional control. But, as China’s expanding African trade relations demonstrate, major-power competition does not automatically translate into greater African bargaining power.

Kenya and Zambia also show the limitations of being strategically valuable partners. Their substantial US-funded health programmes could benefit from stronger Democratic congressional protection, but the White House would retain considerable discretion, potentially leading to political gridlock over funding and disbursement.

Egypt and Nigeria occupy a similarly ambiguous position. Egypt’s security importance has prompted US waivers of human-rights conditions on military assistance, while Nigeria faces growing pressure over apparent religious violence alongside continued counter-terrorism cooperation. For both, priorities could preserve bilateral cooperation while intertwining African governments with more personalised and unpredictable US demands.

Congressional confrontation over spending could generate wider financial volatility, compounding the vulnerabilities of African economies already facing elevated debt-servicing costs and constrained access to international capital.

For African governments, the key lesson is that congressional relationships cannot substitute for a clear understanding of the White House’s priorities. Those able to offer strategically valuable assets while diversifying external partnerships will possess greater room for manoeuvre. Others may become increasingly vulnerable to coercive diplomacy.

Ultimately, Mr Trump’s weakened domestic position should not be confused with diminished international ambitions. With legislative victories increasingly difficult to secure, foreign policy could become one of the few remaining arenas where Trump can pursue his most visible political achievements and cement his legacy.

For Africa, the midterms may have altered the balance of power in the US, but the next two years could prove more volatile for countries on both sides of Trump’s transactional diplomacy.

Ronak Gopaldas is an Institute for Security Studies (ISS) Consultant and Signal Risk Director. Priyal Singh is an ISS Senior Research Consultant and Signal Risk Geopolitical Analyst.

(This article was first published by ISS Today, a Premium Times syndication partner. We have their permission to republish).